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In the late 18th century many
British leaders, including Prime Minister William Pitt, believed that the Irish
colonial ruling class had failed to provide strong leadership and stability in
Ireland. The British Government proposed the complete political union of Ireland
and the British
Empire as the only practical solution to this perceived problem.
The proposition for the creation of the United Kingdom created a large amount of
debate and resistance within the two countries. Still the Act was accepted by
the British parliament, and the Dublin parliament (see photo) voted for its own abolition on
August 1, 1800. This move was officially known as the Act of Union and is often
cited as the beginning of unjust and dominating control of Ireland by the
British Empire. Although England had been attempting to control Ireland for
centuries, this official government action made the control more legally
justifiable. The Act of Union officially took effect on January 1, 1801
(Campbell 11).
Stereotypes
Although the Act of Union officially joined Britain and Ireland together under one government, many British citizens and government officials considered the Irish to be inferior. As author Stephen Campbell states, “The Irish poor were perceived as being of a different and degenerate race and religion” (14). There was a general perception that rich was better than poor, Anglo-Saxon than Celt, and Protestant than Catholic (Campbell 24). A quote from the London Times on January 3, 1848, clearly expresses this sentiment: “It will be difficult for most of our readers to feel near akin with a class which at best wallows in pigsties and hugs the most brutish degradation” (Campbell 13). In this statement it is easy to feel the contempt with which many Britons approached the Irish people and culture. These stereotypes were even perpetuated by high-ranking officials such as Charles Trevelyan, the treasury secretary, who said the British should not fear the famine, but “the moral evil of the selfish, perverse and turbulent character of the people” (Campbell 24). Because the Irish were often considered a problem and less than human, public opinion and government policy often created unfair and damaging conditions for the citizens of Ireland. In addition, many in Britain believed the Irish were the cause of their own problems. As a result, they were often unwillingly to extend substantial help (Quinn 74).
lamity" 29). The Poor
Law was not meant to provide widespread relief or deal with a disaster as
widespread as the Irish potato famine. As a result, the Irish Poor Law could not
provide sufficient relief to the Irish people. To add to the problem, even when
the horrors of the Great Famine were recognized and well-known, the British held
fast to their refusal to extend the Poor Law and add to the kinds of aid it
encompassed, even after warnings from its creator George Nicholls about its
"inability to provide sufficient relief during a period of acute distress or
famine" (Kinealy, "Calamity" 62). As a result, the famine relief provided in Ireland was
perversely inadequate.
· Export Policy
The export policies in England and Ireland in the first half of the eighteenth-century also contributed to the dire distress caused by the Great Famine. The most important trade circumstance in relation to the famine was the export of grain and other crops out of Ireland. Because of the diversity found in Ireland's economy, the country was able to produce surplus food (Kinealy, "Calamity" 15). Most Irish peasants exported much of their produce to England to pay rent and other costs of living, while they lived on their own potato crops (Quinn 74). According to Stephen Campbell, "By the 1840s, three million Irish consumed little else but the potato" (20). Arline Golkin's Famine: A Heritage of Hunger reports that by the beginning of the 18th century the potato constituted 80% of food intake by the poor (52). As a result, the loss of the potato crop meant that the Irish would need other food sources or face starvation. Unfortunately, England was highly dependent on Irish crops, and because they held power over the Irish government, exportation of food crops was not reduced as the famine spread. As Golkin states, "Wheat and oats were transported to England instead of being retained to replace losses caused by potato crop failures" (53). The perception of this practice is well-expressed in the following poem from the time:
"Take it from us every grain,
We were made for you to drain;
Black starvation let us feel,
England must not want a meal" (Kinealy, "Politics" 2).
Essentially, the Irish watched the food that could have saved them from starvation and death being taken by the imperialist power that repressed them. As Amartya Sen gracefully stated, "Famine is a characteristic of some people not having enough food; it is not a characteristic of there not being enough food" (Golkin, 17). Despite the fact that the Irish continued to work and raise crops and livestock, they were not allowed to enjoy the produce. As a result, the uneven export policy in place during the Great Famine added to the suffering of Ireland's people.
A form of outside assistance, public works, was introduced in March of 1846. Four bills were passed in an attempt to increase employment through projects directed by the Board of Works. Most of the work involved manual labor, especially road building and other utility work (Campbell 34). These projects were meant to provide temporary relief to the Irish. The agreement for road repair was often based on a split monetary contribution of a 50% grant from the government and a 50% contribution by local Grand Juries (Kinealy, "Calamity" 39, 54). While the public works programs may seem very positive upon first glance, it is important to note that many provisions reduced the amount of relief actually provided.
The first issue was the delay in implementation. The works were not even introduced until the famine had already begun to take a major toll in Ireland. In addition, once the works had been approved, many of the projects took months to begin, allowing more and more people to become destitute and ill, or die (Campbell 24).
Secondly, the demand for work was much higher that the amount of available employment. Many of the people who left farms and crops in the hopes of finding employment on the public works were ignored (Campbell 34).
The wage given to workers on the public works was extremely low at about 9d or 10d per day. This amount often did not provide enough relief for those who had already lost everything. Sometimes workers were given food instead of wages so that they could at least keep their families from starvation (Kinealy, "Calamity" 57).
There was also a problem with the staffing for and approval of works projects. It was very difficult to find enough engineers and other professionals to oversee the projects. In addition, approval often involved passing a request through a long list of administrators, a process which took time and delayed aid (Kinealy, "Calamity" 56).
Chairman of the relief commission Edward Lucas understood these problems and argued that an adjustment of public works needed to be made to meet the need wherever it occurred or death from famine would result (Kinealy, "Calamity" 43). Unfortunately, the English government did not listen to Lucas's warnings and soon replaced him. It was this decision and many like it that resulted in an insufficient level of aid and the failure of a program that could have greatly decreased the negative effects of the famine.
· Other Contributing Factors
A contributing factor to England's neglect of Ireland was the belief in the laissez-faire style of government. This policy functioned under the belief that government should interfere as little as possible, and that people should be allowed to make their own choices, regulate their own actions, and solve their own problems (Quinn 74). Adam Smith, the father of this philosophy, based this belief on the idea that "the wealth of a nation could be increased if the market was free from constraints" (Kinealy, "Calamity" 7). In addition, the laissez-faire theory held that "charity was degrading to its recipients" (Golkin 51). By the time the British realized the long-term effects of applying this theory to the famine in Ireland, it was too late.
A major event that aided in maintaining England's non-interference stance was
the forced resignation of England's Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, in 1846.
Peel had attempted to institute legislation that would provide food and local
relief programs to much of Ireland. Many disagreed with these actions, and he
was
replaced by John Russell
(see photo), a Whig government member. The new government chose
public works as its main source of relief and reduced Britain's financial
contribution toward local relief. These changes made landlords and private
charities more responsible for aid and made relief more difficult for people to
obtain. By 1849 the situation was even worse, as only people who occupied less
than a quarter of an acre of land were eligible for relief (Kinealy, "Politics" 2).
Finally, short-term shortages in food had occurred in Ireland in previous years, and it was initially thought that the same was true of the Great Famine. Therefore, temporary relief measures that had found success in the past were used (Kinealy, "Calamity" 39). Unfortunately, the Great Famine was a widespread, severe event that affected almost all of Ireland. The short-term methods provided by the government were not enough to counteract its devastating effects.
Apology
Although the English government did not extend the necessary relief during the famine, there was some acknowledgement of deficiency as time went on. As early as 1850 a British parliamentary committee of enquiry concluded, "A neglect of public duty has occurred and has occasioned a state of things disgraceful to a civilized age and country" (Kinealy, "Politics" 4). Yet it was not until 1997, 150 years after the events occurred, that Tony Blair officially apologized for the severe neglect of the Irish people during the famine.
* Quote taken from Campbell, Stephen J. The Great Irish Famine. Colour Books: Ireland, 1995.
** Images taken from Acrimony (Dublin Parliment), Ireland Story (Relief), and Irish Famine (Russell).
Annotated
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Copyright © 2006 All Rights
Reserved.
Authored by Angela Pfeiffer
Last Updated on March 2006.